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ABSTRACT
CEDAW IS COMMITTED TO ELIMINATING ALL FORMS OF
DISCRIMINATION AND ACHIEVING GENDER EQUALITY SO
THAT ALL WOMEN CAN EXERCISE AND ENJOY THEIR HUMAN
RIGHTS. THIS ARTICLE ARGUES THAT THIS IMPLICITLY
INCLUDES A COMMITMENT TO UNDERSTANDING AND
ADDRESSING INTERSECTIONAL DISCRIMINATION. WOMEN
EXPERIENCE DISADVANTAGE AND DISCRIMINATION BASED
ON THEIR SEX AND GENDER AND THAT IS INEXTRICABLY
LINKED TO OTHER IDENTITIES, FACTORS AND EXPERIENCES
SUCH AS A RACE AND POVERTY. UNDER CEDAW, IF
SEX AND GENDER IS ONE OF THE BASES FOR THE
DISCRIMINATION, IT IS NECESSARY TO EXAMINE HOW
OTHER IDENTITY AND FACTORS CONTRIBUTE TO GENDER
DISCRIMINATION AND INEQUALITY. THE CEDAW COMMITTEE
HAS BEEN PIONEERING THIS APPROACH IN THE GENERAL
RECOMMENDATIONS, INDIVIDUAL COMMUNICATIONS, INQUIRY
PROCEDURE AND CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS, BUT IT
HAS NOT BEEN CONSISTENTLY APPLYING THIS FLUID
AND EXPANSIVE APPROACH. THE ARTICLE POSES THREE
COMPLEMENTARY SOLUTIONS TO THESE INCONSISTENCIES:
A TRANSFORMATIVE EQUALITY ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK,
A GENERAL RECOMMENDATION ON INTERSECTIONALITY
AND WORKSHOPS AND TRAINING FOR CEDAW COMMITTEE
MEMBERS. 
KEYWORDS
INTERSECTIONALITY; GROUNDS-BASED DISCRIMINATION;
CEDAW; GENDER; POVERTY; INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW.
RESUMO
O CEDAW COMPROMETE-SE A ELIMINAR TODAS AS
FORMAS DE DISCRIMINAÇÃO E ALCANÇAR A IGUALDADE
DE GÊNERO PARA QUE TODAS AS MULHERES POSSAM
EXERCER E GOZAR DE SEUS DIREITOS HUMANOS. ESTE
ARTIGO ARGUMENTA QUE ISSO INCLUI IMPLICITAMENTE
O COMPROMISSO DE COMPREENDER E ABORDAR A
DISCRIMINAÇÃO INTERSECCIONAL. AS MULHERES
EXPERIMENTAM DESVANTAGEM E DISCRIMINAÇÃO COM
BASE NO SEU SEXO E GÊNERO, MAS ISSO TAMBÉM ESTÁ
INTRINSECAMENTE LIGADO A OUTRAS IDENTIDADES,
FATORES E EXPERIÊNCIAS, TAIS COMO RAÇA E POBREZA.
SOB A PERSPECTIVA DO CEDAW, SE SEXO E GÊNERO SÃO
UMA DAS BASES PARA A DISCRIMINAÇÃO, É NECESSÁRIO
EXAMINAR COMO OUTRAS IDENTIDADES E FATORES
CONTRIBUEM PARA A DISCRIMINAÇÃO DE GÊNERO E
DESIGUALDADE. O COMITÊ CEDAW TEM SIDO PIONEIRO
NESSA ABORDAGEM NAS RECOMENDAÇÕES GERAIS,
COMUNICAÇÕES INDIVIDUAIS, INQUÉRITO E OBSERVAÇÕES
FINAIS, MAS NÃO TEM CONSISTENTEMENTE APLICADO
ESTA ABORDAGEM FLUIDA E EXPANSIVA. O ARTIGO
APRESENTA TRÊS SOLUÇÕES COMPLEMENTARES A ESTAS
INCONSISTÊNCIAS: UM QUADRO ANALÍTICO DE IGUALDADE
TRANSFORMADORA, UMA RECOMENDAÇÃO GERAL SOBRE
INTERSECCIONALIDADE E CURSOS E TREINAMENTO PARA
OS MEMBROS DO COMITÊ CEDAW.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE
INTERSECCIONALIDADE; CEDAW; “GROUNDS-BASED
DISCRIMINATION”; GÊNERO; POBREZA; DIREITO
INTERNACIONAL DOS DIREITOS HUMANOS.
INTRODUCTION
Intersectionality recognises that individuals can experience discrimination on the
basis of multiple and intersecting identities. The Committee for the Convention on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)1 has observed that eth-
nic minority women, elderly, disabled and migrant women, women in prisons and
women and girls on the street are particularly vulnerable to disadvantage and discrimi-
nation (CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Turkey; CEDAW Committee,
Concluding Observations: Canada; CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations:
Kenya). The discrimination these women face is not ‘fully described by simply adding
two kinds of discrimination together’ (FREDMAN, 2011, p. 140). Rather the intersec-
tional discrimination is cumulative and ‘the result is qualitatively different, or syner-
gistic’ (Ibid). In many national contexts, discrimination must be based on a recog-
nised status based ground.2 This approach to discrimination law has been criticised
as being unable to capture the nuanced and complex reasons why a woman with an
intersectional identity experiences disadvantage (CRENSHAW, 1989). National courts
continue to struggle on how to properly evaluate and take account of the qualitative-
ly different intersectional discrimination (IYER, 1993; CONAGHAN, 2007). At the
same time, the CEDAW Committee has quietly been transcending these challenges
and pioneering a promising approach to protecting women with multiple and inter-
secting identities against discrimination.
There are no specific provisions in CEDAW recognising women’s intersection-
al identity, Due to this silence, CEDAW has been accused of not protecting intersec-
tional discrimination. Bond argues that CEDAW ‘fails to adequately consider inter-
locking forms of oppression... [CEDAW] provides protection to a monolithic category
of women, a category characterised by women who experience only gender discrimina-
tion, rather than mutually reinforcing forms of discrimination such as racism, classism,
ethnocentrism and heterosexism’ (BOND, 2003, p. 95; ROSEMBLUM, 2011; OTTO,
2010 p. 357). On the other hand, Byrnes observes that ‘the [CEDAW] Committee in
its practice has identified many groups of women to whom the Convention extends
protection on the basis of their sex in combination with another status’ (BYRNES,
2011, p. 68; RADAY, 2012). While the Committee is in fact addressing women’s
intersectional discrimination, the legal basis for this remains unclear (CUSACK and
PUSEY, 2013 p. 63). Furthermore, there is no clear understanding if the CEDAW
Committee has comprehensively and coherently approached intersectional discrim-
ination in the Concluding Observations, Individual Communications or Inquiry
Procedure. This article addresses these concerns and has two strands of inquiry. First,
how has CEDAW and the CEDAW Committee approached the problem of intersec-
tional discrimination? This article demonstrates that rather than ignoring women’s
identities, CEDAW and the CEDAW Committee adopt an expansive and fluid approach
to intersectional discrimination that is based on achieving gender equality. Rather
CEDAW AND WOMEN’S INTERSECTING IDENTITIES: A PIONEERING NEW APPROACH:480
REVISTA DIREITO GV, SÃO PAULO
11(2) |  P. 479-504 | JUL-DEZ 2015
than limiting itself to traditional status based grounds, if women experience dis-
crimination in relation to an identity, experience or cross-cutting problem that inter-
acts with and is rooted in their sex and/or gender they are protected under CEDAW.
Second, the article then examines how the CEDAW Committee in the Concluding
Observations, Individual Communications and Inquiry Procedure applies its under-
standing of intersectional discrimination. Specifically it uses women, race and pover-
ty as a case study to assess how the Committee is applying its fluid and expansive
approach to intersectional discrimination. In applying this new approach, the CEDAW
Committee makes repeated references to intersectional discrimination and draws
to the states’ attention that women of a minority race or ethnicity disproportion-
ately live in poverty. However, at times the CEDAW Committee is inconsistent and
inattentive to women’s intersectional disadvantage. Understanding intersectionality
as a component of equality in CEDAW provides the tools to ensure a more compre-
hensive approach.A transformative equality framework demonstrates how the CEDAW
Committee can fully integrate an intersectional perspective and address the unique
needs of racial and ethnic minority women who live in poverty and all women with
multiple identities.
This first section briefly examines the discontinuities between intersectional the-
ory and discrimination law, particularly the challenges raised by discrimination law’s
focus on grounds. The second section investigates how similar UN treaty bodies
approach intersectional discrimination. The critique in these two sections is used to
demonstrate how CEDAW has moved beyond a grounds-based approach to discrim-
ination and through its unique approach transcended the gap between theory and
practice. The third section analyses the text of CEDAW, supplemented by the inter-
pretation of the CEDAW Committee in the General Recommendations, to demon-
strate that CEDAW’s commitment on eliminating discrimination against all women
necessarily includes eliminating intersectional discrimination against women. The
fourth section explains the methodology used for evaluating how the CEDAW
Committee has applied intersectional discrimination. The fifth analyses a sample of
Concluding Observations, the Individual Communications and Inquiry Procedure to
demonstrate the CEDAW Committee’s strengths and weaknesses in applying this
fluid approach to intersectional discrimination. While there are differences between
international and national discrimination law, the CEDAW Committee’s approach to
intersectional discrimination can open new channels for thinking how discrimination
law can respond to intersectional theory. 
1 THE DISCONTINUITY BETWEEN INTERSECTIONALITY THEORY AND
DISCRIMINATION LAW
This section briefly sketches the insights derived from intersectional theory and some
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of the challenges in incorporating theory into the practice of discrimination law. It is
not meant to be a comprehensive review of intersectional discrimination but to situa-
te the assessment of CEDAW within the larger debates and bring into focus the inno-
vative approach of CEDAW and the CEDAW Committee. Individuals inherently have
intersectional identities. A white, middle-class, Christian, heterosexual, able-bodied
man has multiple identities based on race, gender, religion and sexual orientation.
Based on certain characteristics an individual can experience privilege while based
on other characteristics the same person can experience disadvantage (ATREY, 2015).
A white, middle-class, Christian, heterosexual woman is privileged in respect of her
race, religion and sexual orientation but disadvantaged on the grounds of her gen-
der. The disadvantaged treatment is predominantly, albeit it is not necessarily exclu-
sively, attributable to her gender. If a black, middle-class, Christian, heterosexual
woman experiences disadvantage, on what basis is she being discriminated against? Is
she experiencing disadvantage due exclusively to her race, gender or are both grounds
at stake? Crenshaw demonstrates that understanding intersecting and multiple iden-
tities are crucial to understanding disadvantage and discrimination. Black women ‘can
experience discrimination in ways that are both similar to and different from those
experienced by white women and Black men’ (CRENSHAW, 1989, p. 149). Crenshaw’s
insight is that black women’s disadvantage cannot be understood exclusively as sex
discrimination or race discrimination. She observes that ‘sometimes Black women
experience discrimination as Black women-not the sum of race and sex discrimina-
tion, but as Black women.’ (Ibid). There is something unique and synergistically dif-
ferent when discrimination involves multiple identity characteristics (FREDMAN,
2011, p. 139). 
In many jurisdictions—Canada, US, South Africa, the UK—discrimination law
continues to struggle on how to incorporate the insights of intersectionality theory
into practice. There are multiple sites, within the legal framework, that impede the
full recognition of intersectionality (ATREY, 2015). This section focuses on the key
critiques of grounds as CEDAW’s fluid and expansive approach developed in the pre-
ceding sections addresses many of the discontinuities between intersectionality and
grounds. In discrimination law, as formulated in many domestic jurisdictions, grounds
serve a gate-keeping function. Only disadvantaged treatment that is ‘based on’,
‘because of’, or ‘on the grounds of’ certain recognized identity characteristics amounts
to discrimination in law (GARDNER, 1998, p. 157). Grounds-based approach to
discrimination law developed in Canada, South Africa, the UK and the US has been
criticized by intersectional theorists as failing to capture and remedy discrimination
based on multiple and intersecting identity characteristics. First, the grounds have
been conceptualized based on the experience of the privileged members of the groups
and are not sensitized to include discrimination against sub-groups that possess mul-
tiple identities (CRENSHAW, 1989). Second, under a single ground approach, where
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the claim is based on one identity characteristics, the claimant has to forgo basing
her claim on all of the characteristics that she believes are crucial to explain the dis-
criminatory treatment she experienced (MACKLEM, 2012, p. 203). A single-axis
framework forecloses a sophisticated and nuanced understanding on how the diffe-
rent identity characteristics interact to contribute to the disadvantage treatment. This
makes the discrimination disappear (CRENSHAW, 1989; REAUME, 2002) and
‘there is a serious risk that [the law] will fail to alleviate oppression…’ (BONTHUYS,
2008, p. 29). Third, judicial attempts to move beyond the single ground approach
and address multiple identities routinely fall short of an integrated intersectional
perspective (CONAGHAN, 2007, p. 323). For example, intersecting discrimina-
tion is often approached from an additive or cumulative perspective meaning ‘if a
claimant wishes to plead more than one ground of discrimination, each claim must
be made and proved separately’(Ibidem, p. 323).3This misses the complex interac-
tion between identity characteristics. Fourth, discrimination law is based on the
recognition of enumerated and analogous grounds. If the claimant believes the cause
of their discrimination is a new ground she faces two potential challenges. First, if
the list of grounds is closed or exhaustive, she cannot bring an aspect of her iden-
tity to the attention of the court. This raises similar challenges to single ground
approach as not all elements that contribute to the disadvantaged treatment are exam-
ined. Second, if the list of grounds is open and the court can interpret in new grounds,
she has to argue for the recognition of this ground. However, there is still no con-
sensus on when new grounds should be recognised (REAUME, 2002, p. 128). Fredman
argues the recognition of grounds is largely a matter of politics than legal princi-
ple (FREDMAN, 2011, p. 111). Therefore, the claimant has to choose between
making a difficult legal argument in the absence of any established legal test or for
pragmatic reasons decide not to base her claim on all of the elements of her iden-
tity. There have been repeated calls to ensure that discrimination law adopts an
intersectional perspective and ‘defines complex experiences as closely to their full
complexity as possible and that we do not ignore voices at the margin’ (GRILLO,
1995, p. 20).
What can CEDAW, which has been criticized for being based on a monolithic
woman, contribute to the debates on intersectional discrimination? CEDAW adopts
a single ground approach and yet it is praised for addressing women’s different iden-
tities. This suggests that CEDAW is transcending the discontinuities between inter-
sectional theory and discrimination law. There is under-developed potential in CEDAW
to address that intersectional discrimination can serve as an influential model. This
article investigates and confirms that CEDAW and the CEDAW Committee is pio-
neering a new and fluid approach to intersectional discrimination that more succes-
sfully integrates theory and practice. 
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2 INTERSECTIONALITY AND OTHER UN TREATIES
The UN has a two pronged approach to protecting human rights. It has two main-
stream human rights treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)4 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR)5 that include the principle of non-discrimination and equality and it has
specific status treaties on race6, women, children,7 disability8 and migrant status.9This
part examines how these treaties address intersectional discrimination so as to under-
stand more clearly how CEDAW’s approach is unique. The two mainstream treaties,
the ICCPR and ICESCR adopt an enumerated and analogous grounds approach to dis-
crimination, similar to that adopted in many national constitutions and human rights
instruments. Article 2(1) and Article 2(2) of the ICCPR and ICESCR, respectively
hold that ‘each state party to the present Covenant undertakes to guarantee that the
rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination
of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nation-
al or social origin, property, birth or other status.’ Article 3 of both treaties prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex and Article 26 of the ICCPR creates a freestanding
right to equality and non-discrimination on the same grounds as Article 2(1) of the
ICCPR. The Committee on Economic, Social and Culture Rights (CESCR) has used
‘other status’ to interpret new analogous grounds, including disability, age, nationality,
marital and family status, sexual orientation and gender identity, health status, place
of residence and economic and social situation (CESCR, General Comment No. 20,
§ 28-35). The Human Rights Committee (HRC) has not interpreted any analogous
grounds into the ICCPR. 
There is no reference to intersectional discrimination in the text of either the
ICCPR or ICESCR, but both CESCR and the HRC have addressed intersectional
discrimination in the General Comments. CESCR observes that ‘some individual or
groups of individual face discrimination on more than one of the prohibited grounds...
such cumulative discrimination has a unique and specific impact... and merits par-
ticular consideration and remedying’ (idem). In the context of gender discrimina-
tion the HRC notes that ‘discrimination against women is often intertwined with
discrimination on other grounds... states parties should address the ways in which
instances of discrimination on other grounds affect women in a particular way...’
(HRC, General Comment No. 28, § 30). This remains an essentially grounds-based
approach that examines the interaction between enumerated or analogous status-
based grounds. 
The UN also has a series of treaties that protect particular identity grounds.
Bond argues that the status specific approach to human rights contributes ‘to a frac-
tured understanding of the nature of discrimination, failing to recognise it is often
an inextricable mixture of factors’ (BOND, 2003, p. 93). A careful analysis of the
text and General Comments demonstrate that the status specific treaties actually do
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address intersectional discrimination and have two different approaches to it. First,
similar to the ICCPR and ICESCR, CRC and CMW both refer to the interaction
between the specific identity grounds and other traditional status based grounds.10
Both the CRC and CMW pioneer additional enumerated grounds of discrimination:
the CRC refers to disability and the CMW refers to age, economic position, prop-
erty and marital status. The CRC also protects children in certain experiences and
problems: refugee status (Article 22, CRC) and armed conflict (Article 38, CRC).
The General Comments from the CMW and CRC Committees have never discussed
intersectional discrimination in-depth. However, the CMW observes that women are
predominantly domestic workers and states need to address the ‘discriminatory restric-
tions on women’s migrant status’ (CMW Committee, General Comment No. 1, §
60-61). The CRC General Comments address indigenous (CRC Committee, General
Comment No. 11) and disabled children (CRC Committee, General Comment No.
9) and juvenile justice (CRC Committee, General Comment No. 10). For example,
it notes that indigenous children experience ‘multiple facets of discrimination’
(General Comment No. 11, § 29) and that ‘street children, children belonging to
racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, indigenous children, girl children,
children with disabilities’ face discrimination in the juvenile justice system (General
Comment No. 10, § 6). Interestingly, the CRC Committee is not limiting intersec-
tional discrimination to status grounds but, examines it through the lens of cross
cutting problems. 
Second, the text of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD) and the Convention on the Protection of Persons with Dis-
abilities (CPRD) do not have a similar provision on the interaction between the spe-
cific status and other grounds of discrimination. However, CRPD does recognise
that women and girls with disabilities experience multiple forms of discrimination
(Articles 6 and 35, CPRD). There are specific provisions that protect children with
disabilities (Article 7, CPRD) and the treaty emphasises the importance of protect-
ing people with disabilities in situations of risk (armed conflict and natural disas-
ters) and humanitarian emergencies (Article 11, CPRD). The CRPD Committee
has only released two General Comments, but it does recognise that women with
disabilities ‘may be subject to multiple and intersectional forms of discrimination
based on gender and disability’ (CPRD Committee, General Comment No. 1, § 35).
The CERD Committee also has two General Recommendations that touch on inter-
sectional discrimination: one on the gender related aspects of racial discrimination
(CERD Committee, General Comment No. 25) and the relationship between race
and citizenship (CERD Committee, General Comment No. 30).
In conclusion, the status specific treaties have been addressing intersectional dis-
crimination. They have made some advances by highlighting how different groups
experience multiple or intersectional discrimination. The CRC Committee has been
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particularly innovative by discussing discrimination in an experience. With this under-
standing in place, it is now time to turn to CEDAW and the CEDAW Committee’s
approach to intersectional discrimination.
3 INTERSECTIONAL DISCRIMINATION IN CEDAW 
There is no provision in CEDAW that refers to the interaction of sex and gender and
other markers of identity. There is no reference to women experiencing discrimina-
tion based on race, religion, ethnicity, migrant status, sexual identity, sexual orien-
tation, disability, age or socio-economic status or in violence, armed conflict or the
justice system. The preamble refers to poverty, racial discrimination, colonialism and
neo-colonialism; however, there are no substantive provisions on these issues in the
treaty. CEDAW has been accused of ‘failing to capture the diversity of women and
the range of their experiences’ and not recognising the ‘complexity of discriminato-
ry practices directed at intersecting identities’ (CHINKIN AND FREEMAN, 2012;
BOND, 2003; ROSENBLUM, 2011; OTTO, 2010). This is a misreading of CEDAW.
This section demonstrates that although there is no explicit reference to intersec-
tional discrimination, the text of CEDAW is alive to the different lived experiences
of all women. 
Article 1 of CEDAW, which defines discrimination protects two identity grounds:
sex and marital status: ‘the term “discrimination against women” shall mean any dis-
tinction...made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing...the
recognition by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men
and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,
social, cultural, civil or any other field’ (emphasis added). The text of CEDAW does
not engage with the meaning of sex or women. Prima facie CEDAW only protects
sex-based discrimination. However, the CEDAW Committee in General Recom-
mendation No. 28 on the state’s core obligations holds that CEDAW covers gender-
based discrimination against women. This is an important development. As sex only
refers to the biological differences between men and women while gender ‘refers
to socially constructed identities, attributes and roles for women and men and soci-
ety’s social and cultural meaning for these biological differences in hierarchical rela-
tionships between women and men in the distribution of power and rights favouring
men and disadvantaging women’ (CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation
No. 28, § 5). Both types of distinctions that impair women’s human rights are includ-
ed in the definition of discrimination in Article 1 of CEDAW. The text of CEDAW does
not directly discuss the meaning of marital status. However, the CEDAW Committee
holds that ‘state parties are obligated to address the sex and gender-based discrimina-
tory aspects of all various forms of family and family relationship’ and, more specifi-
cally, ‘where they are recognised, whether as a de facto union, registered partnership
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or marriage the state party should ensure protection of economic rights of the women
in those relationships’ (CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 29, § 18,
24). This implicitly acknowledges women’s intersectional discrimination as the Com-
mittee discusses marital status it is the context of socio-economic status. This demon-
strates a deep appreciation for how gender-based norms surrounding marital status
interact with socio-economic disadvantage. As it will be discussed below, the CEDAW
Committee, similar to the CRC Committee understands that intersectional discrim-
ination is not confined to status-based grounds but also to cross cutting problems
women experience such as the dissolution of family relationships. 
There are several other identity grounds that are specifically protected in
CEDAW. Article 4(2) and Article 11(2) offers specific protection to women based on
pregnancy and motherhood. Article 9 prohibits discrimination based on nationality
and Article 14 protects rural women and guarantees them the right to participate
and benefit from rural development and access to health care, transportation, hous-
ing, social security, electricity, water, communications and sanitation. CEDAW does
not go as far as the ICESCR, ICCPR, CRC or CMW, but there still is an appreciation
in the text for women’s different identities. 
Although there is no fully developed concept of intersectionality in CEDAW, a
deeper textual analysis reveals that there is an implicit commitment to address all
forms of oppression and disadvantage women experience, including intersectional
discrimination. CEDAW has chosen one specific ground: women and rather than
adopting a grounds based approach and looking at the intersection between different
enumerated and analogous grounds the treaty adopts a fluid and expansive concep-
tion of women that allows an appreciation of the various combinations and permu-
tations of discrimination that women experience. A purposive reading of CEDAW is
the key to unlocking the treaty’s commitment to remedying intersectional discrimi-
nation. The aim of CEDAW is to eliminate discrimination and achieve equality so that
women can enjoy and exercise their human rights and fundamental freedom in all
fields of life (Article 1, CEDAW; CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No.
28, § 4). CEDAW’s commitment to condemn discrimination against women in all its
forms (Article 2, CEDAW) provides a firm textual basis requiring the state to appreci-
ate and account for all the identities, experiences and factors that contribute to gender
discrimination and inequality. The Committee has held that these provisions ‘establish
a comprehensive obligation to eliminate discrimination in all its forms’ (CEDAW
Committee, General Recommendation No. 19, § 10). This inherently includes inter-
sectional discrimination as it is a unique form of discrimination. If women experi-
ence discrimination that is rooted in their sex and/or gender and this intersects with
other aspects of their identity or experiences and results in a denial of human rights
it is can and should be addressed through CEDAW. To achieve the aims of CEDAW,
eliminating discrimination and achieving gender equality requires an appreciation of
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the unique and multiple forms of discrimination that result in the disadvantaged treat-
ment. Raday explains that intersectional is ‘an off-shoot of the core right to equality’
(RADAY, 2012, p. 516).
An example helps to illustrate the implicit commitment to intersectional dis-
crimination. Article 12 requires state parties to ‘take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to ensure,
on a basis of equality of men and women, access to health care.’ To eliminate dis-
crimination and achieve gender equality in health care or any other field of life it
is necessary to appreciate the unique and multiple causes of discrimination. This
is demonstrated by re-examining the facts of Teixeira.11 She was a poor, rural Afro-
descendant Brazilian woman who died due to severe delays in receiving medical
treatment during childbirth. To understand the disadvantage and the inequality in
accessing health care, it is necessary to appreciate how Teixeira’s gender interacts
with other aspects of her identity: race, geographic location and socio-economic
status. Only examining Teixeira through gender is a limited approach because the
evidence demonstrates that socio-economic status is crucial in understanding mater-
nal mortality. The UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health notes that women
in poverty are particularly at risk of maternal mortality (UNSR on the right to
health, 2006, § 10, 28(b)) and the UN Millennium Development Report from 2014
found that the ‘maternal mortality ratio in the developing region [...] was four-
teen times higher than that of developed regions’ (2014, p. 29). It is not solely
Teixeira’s gender but also her race, her poverty and the fact that she lived in rural
Brazil that explain why her rights to accessing health care were so grossly under-
mined. The in-depth analysis of Teixeira in the final section reveals that the CEDAW
Committee has not fully adopted and integrated the intersectional perspective
that is implicit in CEDAW when deciding individual communications. If CEDAW
and the CEDAW Committee are to realise its goals of achieving gender equality
and securing women’s human rights it is crucial to fully understand the complex
and interlocking factors that result in gender inequality and violations of women’s
human rights.
Unlike in the Individual Communications, in the General Recommendations
the CEDAW Committee is interpreting the treaty to ensure an expansive and fluid
approach to intersectional discrimination. The CEDAW Committee’s interpretation
is not legally binding. However, there is increasing recognition that the work of the
CEDAW Committee is an authoritative interpretation and it is ‘undoubtedly true
that [treaty bodies] have considerable legal weight’ (CRAVEN, 1995, p. 9).12 The
CEDAW Committee has ‘contributed through progressive thinking to the clarifica-
tion and understanding of the substantive content of the Convention’s articles and
the specific nature of discrimination against women and the instruments for combat-
ing such discrimination’ (CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 25, § 3).
CEDAW AND WOMEN’S INTERSECTING IDENTITIES: A PIONEERING NEW APPROACH:488
REVISTA DIREITO GV, SÃO PAULO
11(2) |  P. 479-504 | JUL-DEZ 2015
There is great value in understanding how the CEDAW Committee has approached
intersectional discrimination.  
The CEDAW Committee in its work makes limited reference to intersectional
discrimination, but when it does it also adopts the expansive and fluid approach to
intersectionality consistent with the interpretation proposed above. In General, Rec-
ommendation No. 25 on temporary special measures the CEDAW Committee observes
that ‘certain groups of women, in addition to suffering discrimination directed against
them as women, may also suffer from multiple forms of discrimination, based on addi-
tional grounds as race, ethnic or religious identity, disability, age, class, caste or other
factors’ (CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 25, § 12). This is con-
sistent with the approach of the ICCPR and ICESCR in describing intersectional
discrimination. However, in General Recommendation No 28 on state’s obligations,
the CEDAW Committee holds that ‘the discrimination of women based on sex and
gender is inextricably linked with other factors that affect women, such as race eth-
nicity, religion or belief, health, status, age, class, caste, sexual orientation and gen-
der identity’ (CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 28, § 18). This is
a strong statement and goes much further than the other UN treaty bodies that only
refer to multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination. It recognises that ‘cate-
gories of discrimination cannot be reduced to watertight compartments.’13 The
CEDAW Committee is holding that it is impossible to argue that only sex or gender
is the basis for the discriminatory treatment. All aspects of a woman’s identity are
highly relevant when assessing sex and gender discrimination. Under this interpre-
tation so long as sex or gender is one of the bases for the disadvantage treatment it is
permissible and necessary to examine how other identity characteristics are linked
together to explain the disadvantaged treatment. The CEDAW Committee is arguing
that if women interact with different identities then CEDAW can and should be
responding to these new and unique forms of discrimination.
As highlighted above in relation to the dissolution of family relationship and
socio-economic status, the CEDAW Committee is not limiting itself to the tradition-
al grounds based approach to intersectional discrimination. When women experience
discrimination that is rooted in their gender and interacts with other identities, expe-
riences or cross-cutting problem this falls within CEDAW’s commitment to eliminate
all forms of discrimination against women. This addresses one of the leading critiques
of grounds in relation to intersectionality. The conception of women in CEDAW is not
based on a privileged sub-set of women but encompasses all of their identities. If
women experience in relation to certain identities or experiences: migrant status
(CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 26), statelessness (CEDAW
Committee, General Recommendation No. 32) or age (CEDAW Committee, Gen-
eral Recommendation No. 27) they are protected under CEDAW. Furthermore, if
women experience discrimination in relation to certain cross-cutting problems that
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interact with their gender and the substantive obligations in CEDAW, such as the
breakdown of family relationships, violence (CEDAW Committee, General Recom-
mendation No. 19), armed conflict (CEDAW Committee, General Recommenda-
tion No. 30), access to justice (CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No.
32) or poverty they are protected under CEDAW. In a similar vein, in the General
Recommendation No. 27 on older women ‘the discrimination experienced by older
women is often multidimensional, with the age compounding other forms of dis-
crimination based on gender’ inter alia, poverty levels, migrant status, marital or
family status, minority ethnic or indigenous groups. (CEDAW Committee, Gener-
al Recommendation No. 27, § 13). This explanation of intersectional discrimination
is interesting because alongside referring to established enumerated and analogous
grounds, it also refers to literacy, migrant status and poverty. Reference to poverty
is particularly interesting because there is still debate, notwithstanding the recogni-
tion by CESCR, if poverty or socio-economic status should be recognised as a
ground of discrimination (FREDMAN, 2011a, p. 581-87). Including poverty in a
list of other grounds may implicitly be advocating that poverty should be recognised
as a ground or it may be side-stepping the debate and recognising that like literacy,
armed conflict or the breakdown of family relationships poverty is an experience
and contributing factor to discrimination. It also implies that under CEDAW there
is no need to make complex legal arguments for the recognition of new grounds to
ensure that all aspects of an individual’s identity are included in the discrimination.
The fluid, expansive and integrated approach to intersectionality inherently exam-
ines all identity characteristics, experience and problems that contribute to women’s
disadvantage. 
In conclusion, the text of CEDAW and the CEDAW Committee have developed
a sophisticated understanding of intersectional discrimination. Sex and gender dis-
crimination is not isolated and fractured off from other forms of discrimination. Rather
CEDAW and the CEDAW Committee in the General Recommendations approach
from an integrated perspective the harm of intersectional discrimination that is
based on eliminating discrimination and achieving equality. Moreover, there is an
important recognition that disadvantage is not limited to status-based grounds. Encom-
passing the identities and experiences under the umbrella of sex and gender is an
exciting approach as it holds the potential for CEDAW and the CEDAW Commit-
tee to develop a nuanced appreciation of intersectionality.
4 METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYSING THE CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The article now transitions to examine how the CEDAW Committee has used the
expansive and fluid understanding of intersectional discrimination developed in the
General Recommendations and applied it in the Concluding Observations, Individual
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Communications and Inquiry Procedure to address and make recommendations on
women, race and poverty. This part explains the role and function of the Concluding
Observations, Individual Communications and Inquiry Procedure, the methodology
for selecting which Concluding Observations to study in great detail and the evalu-
ative framework for analysing the material. 
Under the Optional Protocol to CEDAW (OP-CEDAW), the individual can file
an Individual Communication, which is an individualised claim that the state party
has violated its obligations under CEDAW.14 The Committee evaluates written sub-
missions from the individual and the state party and releases a decision evaluating the
merits of the claim and provides specific and general recommendations. Article 8 of
the OP-CEDAW permits the Committee to initiate an inquiry procedure to investi-
gate grave or systemic violations of CEDAW. By Article 18 of CEDAW when a state
party becomes a signatory to CEDAW, it must report every four years on how it has
implemented the treaty. The Committee reviews the state report, submission from
the civil society organisations, and conducts an oral question and answer session with
state representatives. It then releases Concluding Observations that highlights the
positive aspects, areas of concern and provide recommendations on how the state
can best implement CEDAW and achieve gender equality. 
As of May 2015, there are 19 Individual Communications on their merits and
two Inquiry Procedures all of which are used in the analysis below. Since there are
over 1200 Concluding Observations, for this study I have selected thirteen states
using four criteria: (i) regular and sustained reporting to the Committee (ii) the
UNDP Gender Inequality Index (iii) World Bank gross national income and (iv)
geographic region. This ensures the analysis is objective and has geographic breadth
as gender and racial poverty is a global problem and it includes states at different
stages of development. 
TABLE 1 – SELECTION OF COUNTRIES FOR INVESTIGATION
COUNTRY 2013 GII RANK GNI GEOGRAPHIC CLASSIFICATION
NORWAY 5 HIGH INCOME WESTERN EUROPE
CANADA 18 HIGH INCOME NORTH AMERICA15
ROMANIA 55 UPPER MIDDLE INCOME EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA
TURKEY 68 UPPER MIDDLE INCOME EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA 
ARGENTINA 71 UPPER MIDDLE INCOME LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN
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MEXICO 72 UPPER MIDDLE INCOME LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN
PHILIPPINES 77 LOWER MIDDLE INCOME EAST ASIA & PACIFIC
BRAZIL 79 UPPER MIDDLE INCOME LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN
JORDAN 99 UPPER MIDDLE INCOME MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA
KENYA 111 LOW INCOME SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
EGYPT 126 LOWER MIDDLE INCOME MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA
BANGLADESH 130 LOW INCOME SOUTH ASIA
ETHIOPIA 173 HUMAN LOW INCOME SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
DEVELOPMENT 
INDEX—GII NOT 
AVAILABLE
For this evaluation, the states chosen for greater study have a gender inequality
index ranging from 5 to 130. In relation to gross national income per capita, there
are two high income countries, six upper middle income countries, two lower mid-
dle income countries and three low income countries. There is one country from
Western Europe, one from North America, two countries from Europe & Central
Asia, three from Latin American & Caribbean, one from East Asia & Pacific, two
from Middle East & North Africa, one from South Asia and two countries from Sub-
Saharan Africa. These four criteria and the thirteen states selected ensure an objec-
tive and comprehensive understanding of how the state has understood the inter-
section between women, race and poverty in relation to CEDAW.
It is also essential to have an analytical framework to properly understand how
the CEDAW Committee has addressed intersectional discrimination in the Individual
Communications, Inquiry Procedure and Concluding Observations. CEDAW aims
to eliminate discrimination and achieve gender equality so that women can enjoy
and exercise their human rights. The mandate to address intersectional discrimination
in CEDAW is linked to the commitment to achieve gender equality. Since gender
equality is a fundamental aim of CEDAW, it offers an ideal framework to assess if the
CEDAW Committee is using intersectional discrimination to achieve the goals of
the treaty. 
This presents a further challenge. Although the CEDAW Committee has explained
that the treaty is premised on both formal and substantive equality (CEDAW Com-
mittee, General Recommendation No. 25, § 7; CUSACK AND PUSEY, 2013, p. 63;
BYRNES, 2013), it has never consistently or coherently explained what it means by
substantive equality. Byrnes describes the CEDAW’s Committee’s approach to equal-
ity as fluid (IBID, p. 64). At times, it indicates equality requires: differential treat-
ment (CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 28, § 16); an equal start;
‘an enabling environment to achieve equality of results’ (CEDAW Committee, Gen-
eral Recommendation No. 25, § 8); ‘strategies for overcoming underrepresentation
of women and a redistribution of resources and power between men and women’
(Ibid); ‘the ability to develop personal ability... [to] make choices without the lim-
itation set by stereotypes, rigid gender roles and prejudices’ (CEDAW Committee,
General Recommendation No. 28, § 22); and most powerfully the ‘real transforma-
tion of opportunities, institutions and systems so that they are no longer grounded in
historically determined male paradigms of power and life patterns’ (CEDAW Com-
mittee, General Recommendation No. 25, § 9). Byrnes convincingly argues that trans-
formative equality is the objective ‘which is embodied in the text and spirit of the
Convention’ (BYRNES, 2013, p. 56). 
There is no accepted definition of transformative equality but there is an emerg-
ing consensus. Cusack and Pusey argue for a two pronged approach to transforma-
tive equality: first, the transformation of ‘institutions, systems and structures that cause
or perpetuate discrimination and inequality’ and second ‘the modification or trans-
formations of harmful, norms, prejudices and stereotypes’ (CUSACK AND PUSEY,
2013, p. 64). Byrnes explains that ‘transformative equality denote[s] a change of
fundamental and far-reaching nature’ (BYRNES, 2013, p. 56) While Fredman argues
transformative equality pursues four-overlapping aims: breaking the cycle of disad-
vantage, promoting respect for dignity and worth, accommodating difference by
achieving structural change and promote political and social inclusion and partici-
pation (FREDMAN, 2011, p. 25) Fredman’s definition of transformative equality is
ideally suited to evaluating laws, policies and programmes, because it offers an easy
to apply yet sophisticated framework in which to assess the nuances of gender inequal-
ity (idem). In assessing how the CEDAW Committee has applied its understanding
of intersectional discrimination, Fredman’s transformative equality is used as an eval-
uative framework.   
Before turning to the Individual Communications, Inquiry Procedure and Con-
cluding Observations, it is necessary to investigate, in further detail, Fredman’s def-
inition of transformative equality. The first element is to redress disadvantage. This
recognises that disadvantage tracks onto identity characteristics. To break this imbal-
ance requires specific and positive measures (ibidem, p. 27-8). The second element
addresses recognition harms such as: harassment, prejudice, stereotypes, stigmas, neg-
ative cultural attitudes, indignity and humiliation (ibidem, p. 29). Third, with respect
to structural change, rather than requiring individual conformity, this dimension
questions and requires institutions and structures to change. For example, the for-
mal labour market is based on male working hours. This has excluded women with
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child care responsibilities from the workforce. Equality demands that the formal
labour market change to account for different life experiences. The fourth element,
the participation dimension requires inclusion of women in all public, private,
political and social decision making processes. Placing these four elements togeth-
er highlights the connection between different types of gender equality harms. For
example, it demonstrates how poverty reduction programmes which are based on a
head of the household model while seemingly addressing women’s disadvantage can
continue to marginalise women and perpetuate gendered relationships of depend-
ency (CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: UK, § 62-3).
5 APPLYING INTERSECTIONAL DISCRIMINATION IN CEDAW
There is overwhelming evidence that the CEDAW Committee is applying the fluid
and expansive concept of intersectional discrimination that it is pioneering in the
General Recommendations in the Concluding Observations, Inquiry Procedure and
Individual Communications. This section uses the relationship between women, race
and poverty as a case study to analyse the CEDAW Committee’s application of this new
approach to intersectionality. This is particularly intriguing because although there
is only one reference to both race and poverty in the preamble of CEDAW, the CEDAW
Committee is interpreting  equality and non-discrimination in CEDAW to  draw out
the connection between women, poverty, race, equality and non-discrimination. At
the same time, the transformative equality framework reveals areas where the CEDAW
Committee can further develop and apply intersectional discrimination. 
The strongest example of the CEDAW Committee’s approach to women, race
and poverty comes from the Inquiry Procedure into missing and murdered aborig-
inal women in Canada. It uses very strong language to explain intersectional discrim-
ination: ‘Aboriginal women face intersectional discrimination stemming from factors...
which are inextricably intertwined’ (CEDAW Committee, Report of Inquiry, § 204).
The CEDAW Committee specifically analyses how gender, race and socio-econom-
ic status contribute to violence against Aboriginal women. The CEDAW Committee
draws strongly on the disadvantage element to analyse intersectional discrimination.
It observes that for poor, rural Aboriginal women ‘hitchhiking is a common prac-
tice’ which ‘increases the risk of Aboriginal women to abduction and being a mur-
der victim’ (ibidem, § 106). Aboriginal women live in inadequate housing, lack edu-
cation and employment opportunities. The CEDAW Committee is concerned that
this ‘increase women’s vulnerability to violence, as a lack of access to such resources
reduces the choices of women prevents them from escaping violence’ (ibidem, §
112). The CEDAW Committee draws on all elements of the transformative equali-
ty framework to propose recommendations. To redress disadvantage, Canada must
improve the socio-economic conditions affecting Aboriginal women (ibidem, § 216).
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Canada had submitted evidence of the poverty reduction plans it has in place but the
CEDAW Committee calls the state to task by observing that the measures it is taking to
reduce socio-economic disadvantage are not focused on the specific needs of Aboriginal
women (ibidem, § 118). To address the recognition harms, the CEDAW Committee
recommends that police officers take seriously reports of missing Aboriginal women
and treat persons making the report with respect and dignity (ibidem, § 216) and
significantly strengthen awareness-raising on Aboriginal culture for police and jus-
tice officials (idem). Drawing on the structural element, the CEDAW Committee
encourages Canada to provide sufficient funding for legal aid, make legal aid avail-
able to Aboriginal women, if necessary free of charge so as to improve the relationship
between Aboriginal women and the justice system, and to conduct a national inquiry
to root out the systemic causes of discrimination and violence against Aboriginal
women (idem). Finally, the Committee recommends that Canada continue to work
with Aboriginal women’s representatives (idem). This represents both a nuanced under-
standing of how intersectional discrimination contributes to women’s poverty, vio-
lence against women and how transformative equality can be used to remedy this
unique form of harm. 
In the Concluding Observations there is also specific attention to the relation-
ship between women, race and poverty. The CEDAW Committee is particularly
aware about how poverty tracks onto other identities. It implicitly uses the trans-
formative equality framework, specifically drawing on the disadvantage element.
Again in Canada, the CEDAW Committee points out that Aboriginal women live in
impoverished conditions ‘which include high rates of poverty, poor health, inade-
quate housing, lack of access to clean water... have higher rates of unemployment
and face a greater pay gap...’ (CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Cana-
da, § 43). Again using the disadvantage element of transformative equality, the CEDAW
Committee recommends that Canada develop a specific and integrated plan and
take effective and proactive measures for addressing the needs of Aboriginal women
(ibidem, § 44). Furthermore, it is concerned that cuts to social assistance rates
‘[have] a negative impact on vulnerable groups of women such as aboriginal women,
Afro-Canadian women [and] immigrant women, who rely on social assistance for an
adequate standard of living’ and recommends that the state ensure ‘that funding
decisions meet the needs of the most vulnerable groups of women and do not result
in discrimination against women’ (ibidem, § 13-14). When reviewing the state
report for Turkey, the CEDAW Committee notes that disadvantaged women—Kur-
dish, ethnic minority, migrant, elderly and disabled women—are more vulnerable
to poverty (CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Turkey, § 38). Similar-
ly, in Romania, Roma woman are disproportionately poor (CEDAW Committee,
Concluding Observations: Romanian, § 26). Finally, in Argentina, the CEDAW
Committee again uses the disadvantage element to draw to the state’s attention to
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the fact that rural indigenous women live in extreme poverty, that they are margin-
alised and lack access to health care, education, credit facilities and community
services (CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Argentina, § 40). There is
evidence that the CEDAW Committee is also using the structural element in rela-
tion to Brazil. Domestic workers in Brazil are principally women of African descent
and are ‘generally excluded from the protection of labour law and are vulnerable to
exploitation by their employers’ (CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations:
Brazil, § 27). The CEDAW Committee recommends that Brazil protect domestic
workers against exploitation and extend legal protection to domestic workers (ibi-
dem, § 28). 
There are also several examples of the CEDAW Committee drawing together
multiple aspects of transformative equality to address intersectional discrimination
in the context of women, race and poverty. In Mexico, the CEDAW Committee uses
the disadvantage element to express concern at the high levels of poverty, illiteracy
and multiple forms of discrimination against indigenous rural women and recom-
mends that poverty eradication strategies pay special attention to this group of
women (CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Mexico (2012), § 434). It
further draws on the participation element to recommend Mexico that rural indige-
nous women be included ‘into the development process both as beneficiaries and as
protagonists’ (CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Mexico, § 403). This
is very important for ensuring the empowerment of women with intersectional
identities. There is also evidence of the CEDAW Committee drawing on the disad-
vantage and recognition elements in relation to the gender pay gap in Brazil. In Brazil,
the CEDAW Committee observes that ‘the wage gap between men and women fluc-
tuates between 17% and 40% depending on the race, ethnicity and education of
women’ and expressed concern that ‘stereotypes related to gender and race con-
tribute of Afro-descendent and indigenous women into lower quality jobs’ (CEDAW
Committee, Concluding Observations: Brazil (2012) § 26). It is the negative cul-
tural attitudes and stereotypes on gender and race (recognition element) that con-
tribute to women’s economic disadvantage (disadvantage element). The recommen-
dations also draw on both elements. Brazil is encouraged to close the gender pay
gap to remedy the economic disadvantage and to ‘adopt effective measures, includ-
ing temporary special measures to eliminate occupational segregation based on
stereotypes relating to gender, race and ethnicity’ (ibidem, § 27(b)). 
While this is a positive development, an in-depth analysis of women, poverty
and race in the Concluding Observations and Individual Communications reveals
that there are a number of inconsistencies in how the CEDAW Committee applies
intersectional discrimination. First, there are inconsistencies in relation to which
states the CEDAW Committee discusses the relationship between gender, race and
poverty. There is no explicit mention of this form of intersectional discrimination
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in the Concluding Observations for Bangladesh, Norway, Jordan or Ethiopia. The
CEDAW Committee is not always consistent in how it addresses intersectionality in
relation to one, individual state. In the sixth reporting round for Brazil, the CEDAW
Committee expresses concern about Afro-Brazil domestic workers, but does not
refer to this issue in the seventh reporting round. Second, related to this inconsis-
tency, at times the CEDAW Committee overlooks the intersectional aspects of sex
and gender discrimination. As one example, in Jordan and Egypt the CEDAW Com-
mittee advocates for the extension of legal protection to domestic workers, but there
is no reference to the race or ethnicity of domestic workers (CEDAW Committee,
Concluding Observations: Jordan, § 44; CEDAW Committee, Concluding Obser-
vations: Egypt, § 35). This is problematic. The International Labour Organisation
estimates that in the Middle East the ‘vast majority of domestic workers are migrants’
(ILO, 2013, p. 32). In Jordan alone there are an estimated 70,000 to 98,000 migrant
domestic workers (FRANTZ, 2014, p. 10) and the abuse and exploitation was so
severe that for a period of time The Philippines banned migration to Jordan (JUREI-
DINI, 2009, p. 77). Third, even when the CEDAW Committee expresses concern
on women’s intersectional discrimination, it does not consistently follow this up with
a tailored recommendation. For example, while the Concluding Observations from
Argentina note that indigenous rural women live in extreme poverty, the concerns
and recommendations on the state’s poverty reduction programmes are solely on
the basis of gender and do not incorporate an intersectional perspective (CEDAW
Committee, Concluding Observations: Argentina, § 18). Research has shown that
the state report and civil society organization submissions to the CEDAW Commit-
tee in the periodic reporting process are influential in ensuring an issue is included
in the Concluding Observations (CAMPBELL, 2014). To ensure a more consistent
approach to intersectional discrimination it is necessary for the state to provide this
information. A possible way to encourage the relevant actors to include data and
information on the situation of women with multiple identities in their submissions
to the CEDAW Committee is through first, a General Recommendation that specif-
ically examines the relationship between CEDAW and intersectionality and second,
by reforming the state reporting guidelines on the periodic report to specifically
ask for the state to address this issue. This would be a step towards ensuring that the
relevant information is before the CEDAW Committee and hopefully improve its
consistency in addressing intersectionality. At the same time, it is also important to
acknowledge that there is a chronic problem with states not providing data on inter-
sectionality and the CEDAW Committee routinely calls for disaggregated data on
the situation of women (CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 9). Collecting data
on women with multiple identities can be both costly and time consuming. There are
two ways this limitation can be overcome. First, the Individual Communications proce-
dure does not require data as these decisions are only examining the intersectional
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discrimination of one woman. This forum is an opportunity for the CEDAW Com-
mittee to delve into the intersectional aspects of the communication. Second, irre-
spective of the lack of data, the CEDAW Committee can be more attentive to inter-
sectional aspects of women’s disadvantage by continually inquiring of the state its
approach to this unique form of discrimination in the constructive dialogue session
of the periodic reporting process. 
There is one further critique of the CEDAW Committee’s current approach to
intersectionality. While the CEDAW Committee uses all of the elements of transfor-
mative equality to address intersectional discrimination, it is strongest in relation to
the disadvantage element of transformative equality. It has yet to employ consistent-
ly the remaining elements of the framework to address intersectional discrimination.
The CEDAW Committee’s decision in Teixeira, the facts which were used in Section
I to explain CEDAW’s implicit commitment to intersectional discrimination, illus-
trates the limits of the CEDAW Committee’s current approach and the potential of
transformative equality framework and intersectional discrimination.
Teixeira was a rural, Afro-Brazilian woman who lived in poverty. A few days
before giving birth, she attended a local health centre complaining of severe nausea
and abdominal pain. Two days later, she delivered a stillborn foetus. She underwent
surgery to remove the placenta 14 hours after delivery, but her condition worsened.
The health centre contacted both public and private hospitals with superior facili-
ties to treat her. One private hospital had space but it refused to send its only ambu-
lance to transport her. Teixeira ‘waited in critical conditions for eight hours to be
transported to the hospital.’16 At the hospital she was left largely unattended in the
hallway for 21 hours until she passed away. She died due to a digestive haemorrhage,
which was the result of the delivery of a stillborn foetus. Her mother filed an indi-
vidual communication and the CEDAW Committee concluded that Teixeira was dis-
criminated against because she was ‘of African descent and on the basis of her socio-
economic background.’17The Committee is correct to take account of Teixeira’s unique
experience, but it seems unsure of the consequences of this finding. In the substan-
tive decision there is no detailed assessment of how her multiple identities contributed
to her death and there is no reference to intersectional discrimination in the CEDAW
Committee’s recommendation. 
Fredman’s transformative equality framework demonstrates how the Commit-
tee can meaningfully assess how Teixeira’s intersectional identity resulted in the
denial of gender equality and her human rights. The disadvantage element can demon-
strate that women living in poverty, in rural areas and women belonging to ethnic
minorities or indigenous populations are among those particularly at risk of mater-
nal mortality (UNSR on the right to health, 2006). These insights can be used to eval-
uate whether Brazil’s polices are targeted towards the needs of disadvantaged women
and can be used to create meaningful recommendation such as low cost speedy access
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to emergency obstetric health services. The recognition element requires the CEDAW
Committee to investigate if the hospital personnel treated her differently due to her
race and poverty and can require Brazil to ensure that hospital staff receives train-
ing to ameliorate these negative and prejudicial attitudes. Drawing both the recog-
nition and structural elements together, the CEDAW Committee can question how
negative stereotypes affect the location, funding, quality and staffing of maternal
health facilities where ethnic, indigenous or poor women live. The participation ele-
ment requires women’s participation in the development of maternal health poli-
cies. In their submission to the CEDAW Committee Brazil does mention that the
policies included women’s participation, it would be helpful to remind Brazil that
participation includes voices that are routinely marginalised: the poor, indigenous
and rural women.18
CONCLUSIONS
CEDAW is committed to eliminating all forms of discrimination and achieving gen-
der equality so that all women can exercise and enjoy their human rights. This implic-
itly includes a commitment to understanding and addressing intersectional discrim-
ination. Women experience disadvantage and discrimination based on their sex and
gender and that is inextricably linked to other identities, factors and experiences
such as a race and poverty. Under CEDAW, if sex and gender is one of the bases for
the discrimination, it is necessary to examine how other identity and factors con-
tribute to the discrimination. This transcends the discontinuities between intersection-
ality theory and practice. It moves intersectionality beyond a ground-based approach
and approaches multiple identities from a fluid, expansive and integrated perspective.
The CEDAW Committee has been pioneering this approach in the General Recommen-
dations, Individual Communications, Inquiry Procedure and Concluding Observations,
but it has not been consistently applying it. 
There are three complementary solutions to these inconsistencies. The legal basis
for intersectional discrimination in CEDAW is equality. The equality framework,
particularly transformative equality, is a powerful analytical tool to ensure the CEDAW
Committee fully incorporates an intersectional perspective. As mentioned above,
the second is to release a General Recommendation on intersectionality that draws
significantly on race and poverty. A General Recommendation is an important tool
to signal to state parties, other relevant stakeholders and the CEDAW Committee
on the importance of reporting and taking action on addressing intersectional dis-
crimination. There are other creative solutions. Third, there are seminars, workshops
and training that the CEDAW Committee could hold to ensure its attention is direct-
ed towards intersectional discrimination. There needs to be a shift in the mindset of
the treaty bodies to recognise. The legal basis and tools are in place to use CEDAW
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as a platform for constructive dialogue sessions with state parties on developing
best practices to eliminate intersectional discrimination. 
National and regional human rights instruments are usually framed differently
than CEDAW. The individual can usually chose various grounds on which to base their
claim for discrimination while under CEDAW the text of CEDAW has chosen one
specific ground: sex and gender. Using a specific ground CEDAW implicitly ensures
a rich understanding of the complex and interlocking ways women experience dis-
crimination and this ensures intersectional discrimination is addressed in the treaty.
The textual difference between other human rights instruments and CEDAW is
important but CEDAW’s fluid and expansive approach can serve as springboard to
new and creative thinking on the relationship between grounds and intersectional
discrimination at both the domestic and international level.
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